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IDENTITY CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE 
SPANISH ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA 
 




This article will examine the border and identity challenges for the 
Spanish (semi)enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are surrounded by 
the Moroccan state. This issue is obviously related to the study of ter-
ritorial boundaries and more specifically to the EU's relationship with 
the underdeveloped economic sphere to its south. Indeed, Ceuta and 
Melilla highlight the double standards of the EU, which was founded 
to build bridges across borders but at the same time has built barriers 
(in Ceuta and Melilla actual physical barriers) at its southern border 
which have underpinned the idea of fortress Europe. Thus, the 
anomalous geographical location of both Spanish cities exposes them 
to border and identity challenges as well as to a complex situation of 
interdependent concentric circles which involves the enclaves (first 
circle), Spain, Morocco (second circle) and the EU (third circle). The 
aim of this article is to analyse the three concentric circles, paying spe-
cial attention to the implications of having African enclaves for an EU 
state. Finally, the article scrutinises the importance of symbolism and 
its pivotal role in creating lines of division and political conflict at the 
local and national level. 
 
Introduction 
Ceuta1 and Melilla2 are two Spanish coastal-enclaves3 located in north-
ern Africa. They constitute the only territories in mainland Africa 
which belong to an EU member state and, as a result, the only land 
border between the two continents. According to Berramdane (2008, 
                                         
1Its total perimeter has a length of 28 km, 8 of which constitute the land border 
with Morocco (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) 
2 Its total perimeter has a length of 20km, 11 of which constitute the land border 
with Morocco (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) 
3 According to the definition provided by Vinokurov (2007, p.10), enclaves are 
territories enclosed within a territory of another state. Coastal-enclaves or semi-
enclaves like Ceuta and Melilla only differ in the fact that they possess a sea 
border. 
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p.239) Ceuta and Melilla are vestiges of the grandeur of the Spanish 
Empire. Both enclaves became European cities by treaty when Spain 
joined the European Community in 1986. In 1995 they became 
autonomous towns and their statutes of autonomy state clearly that 
the enclaves are an integral part of the Spanish nation within its indis-
soluble unity. Their anomalous geographical location exposes them to 
border and identity challenges as well as to a complex situation of in-
terdependent concentric circles which involves the enclaves, Spain, 
Morocco and the EU. 
 
Figure 1-Strait of Gibraltar map (BBC) 
 
The complex divisions of the enclaves can be divided into three differ-
ent concentric circles. Firstly, the local circle (1st circle), which denotes 
the border crossing and the border in general, and the political divi-
sions within the enclave4. The second circle constitutes the national 
border and involves the surrounding state (Morocco) and the main-
land (Spain) and their bilateral relations, which are largely shaped by 
the enclaves’ existence. Finally, the third circle refers to the EU and its 
borders with its Muslim neighbours in northern Africa. This third cir-
cle not only implies a post-national border between the EU and non-
EU states but also concerns the broader civilisational divide between 
the so called West and Islam. 
 
Border challenges 
The first assumption of this article is that the de-territorialisation5 
process and the softening of borders produced by the (almost) disap-
pearance of the EU’s internal borders is in sharp contrast with the 
hardening of borders that is taking place within the EU external bor-
                                         
4 there is a significant Muslim minority which is politically organised along with 
Jews and Indian merchants. 
5 Deleuze and Guattari created the term de-territorialisation in their book Anti-
Oedipus (1972) to refer to the process of global communities being embedded in 
local communities and consequent declining of ties between culture and place 
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ders. Needless to say that Ceuta and Melilla are at the core of the ex-
ternal borders of the EU.  
 Thus, borderlands such as Ceuta and Melilla are those parts of 
the world where the de-territorialisation process is not perceived to be 
as apparent as in other parts of the world. In other words, the 
specificities of borderlands lead the population of these areas to stress 
their identity and therefore to redress the de-territorialisation. 
Moreover, the physical frontiers in Ceuta and Melilla, which serve as a 
reminder of the border significance, are in sharp contrast with the de-
territorialisation discourses.  
 As argued by Billig (1995, p.139), one of the main problems of 
postmodernist approaches is that the elements of nationalist con-
sciousness seem to be persisting. Mellor (1989, p.74) and Williams 
(2006, p.22) have both stressed that contemporary territorial borders 
are (still) inherently a source of trouble and a constant potential cause 
of friction between neighbours that political leaders have to con-
sciously attempt to overcome. Anderson et al (2003, p.7) would add 
that territoriality is prone to generating conflict because of its finite 
and fixed character which encourages zero-sum thinking. 
 As the Italian sociologist Raimondo Strassoldo predicted back in 
1982 (1982, p.133), the successful integration of the EU has led to an 
intensification of frontier problems with non-EU states. In fact, this ar-
ticle argues that the process of integration of the EU, which has led to 
the abolition of the internal borders and the reinforcement of the ex-
ternal ones (Frontex, the building of fences in Ceuta and Melilla and 
SIVE6), has deepened the Mediterranean divide (Driessen 1998, p.100) 
between the north and the south and has encouraged the southern 
mistrust.  
 From the Spanish perspective, this border of borders is chal-
lenged by two main issues. On the one hand, in terms of territoriality 
since Morocco has claimed sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla and several 
islands on the southern Mediterranean shore since the very first day of 
its independence in 1956. Indeed, Morocco has brought the enclaves 
question to the UN Assembly on several occasions, unsuccessfully 
                                         
6 System of Integrated External Surveillance. The Spanish Guardia Civil is in 
charge of the SIVE, a security system which allows the monitoring of illegal 
immigration in the coasts of Andalucia and the Canary Islands. It operates 
through mobile and fixed radars. It has monitored Ceuta since 2005. 
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trying to put them onto the UN decolonisation list7. One of the recur-
rent arguments used by Morocco has been to draw comparisons with 
Spain’s claims on Gibraltar (Lethinen 2005). However, one of the main 
differences between these cases is that unlike Ceuta and Melilla, 
Gibraltar is mentioned in the UN decolonisation list. 
 On the other hand, the fences8 that surround Ceuta and Melilla 
pose a challenge for the border since they contribute to make the en-
claves extreme examples of gated communities. Walters (2004, p.692), 
for instance, describes the wall in Ceuta (we should add also the one in 
Melilla), which was built in order to defend the enclave(s) from mi-
grants seeking their way into the EU, as the best material representa-
tion of the idea of Fortress Europe. 
 Indeed, hundreds of immigrants coming mostly from the south 
of the Sahel attempted to cross the fences in October 2005. The result 
was the death of 13 people and the fences were militarised from both 
sides for two months9. Beyond the tragic consequences, these events 
showed the shortfalls of the security and public order policy intro-
duced by Spain and the EU along its southern border (Soddu 2006, 
p.212) as well as the inefficiency of blocking borders in order to stop a 
world-scale phenomenon like immigration. Unfortunately, this has not 
been an isolated episode and the attempts by Sub-Saharans to reach 
the enclaves have become a common trend. The last attempt occurred 
in Melilla in June 2008 during the Euro quarter-finals.  
 
Living in a border region or enclave 
What makes these cities interesting politically, sociologically and 
anthropologically is that they are not only caught between two states 
but also between the EU and Africa, between Christianity and the 
Muslim world, between the 1st developed world and the 3rd world, 
between “us” and “them”, between those who regard themselves as 
“civilisation” and those who are regarded as “barbarians”. (Driessen 
                                         
7 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm 
8 Both fences are 6 metres high and feature barbed-wire, motion sensors, over a 
hundred CCTV and infra-red cameras along with dozens of control towers. 
9In ordinary circumstances, the Spanish side is patrolled by 331 police officers and 
676 Guardias Civiles in Ceuta and 316 police officers and 626 Guardias Civiles in 
Melilla9. During the October crisis, 480 soldiers from the Spanish army were also 
deployed along both borders during two months 
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1996, 1998; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Gold 2000; Ferrer-Gallardo 
2006).  
 These divisions are enhanced by some Spanish authors who con-
sider Ceuta and Melilla as a European penetration which serves to 
contrast the XXI Century and the last bastions of the Middle Ages10 
(Seco Serrano 2002) and whose task has been to defend Western values 
(Campos Martinez 2004, p.9). Due to this multiplicity of divisions, 
Ferrer-Gallardo (2006, p. 2) has labelled the Spanish and Moroccan 
frontier as “border of borders”. 
 Let me provide an example of the disparities of this border: 
Alvarez claims (1995, p.451) that no other border in the world exhibits 
the inequality of power and economic conditions that the US-Mexico 
border does. However, on a closer examination, this assertion is 
proved to be false because the economic imbalance between Spain and 
Morocco is higher and, arguably, so is the difference between Morocco 
and the EU in terms of power. Spain has a gross domestic product 
(GDP) $ per capita of 30,120 and Morocco’s GDP $ per capita is 4,075, 
while the U.S is $ 45845 and Mexico $ 12774.11 Adjusted the cost of liv-
ing, the per capita income difference between Spain and Morocco has 
a ratio of approximately 6:1, while between the U.S and Mexico it is 
4:1. What seems clear is that in both cases (the U.S and Europe) the 
traditional police function of borders has been reasserted.  
 Owing to their geographical location, the Spanish enclaves seem 
to challenge the natural border represented by the Mediterranean; 
they are politically in the north but geographically in the south. This 
specific background leads to several paradoxes that have been high-
lighted by Peter Gold (2000, p.1-2) such as the fact that they are located 
in the world’s poorest continent but they belong to the richest trading 
block in the world. In addition, they are physically on the African 
continent but the majority of their citizens are fully European. It 
should also be noted that, as is the case with the rest of Spanish terri-
tory, both cities are entitled to elect MEPs to the EU parliament. 
 Their specific geographic position has also implied that the en-
claves have been held up as a good example of Schengen flexibility 
(Apap and Tchorbadjiyska 2004, p.6). In a protocol attached to the 
Schengen acquis it is stated that the citizens from the Moroccan prov-
                                         
10 Implicitly pointing at Morocco.  
11 http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php 
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inces adjacent to Ceuta (Tetouan) and Melilla (Nador) are exempted 
from visa requirements (European Council 2000, p.7312). Moroccans 
from outside these two provinces, though, remain subject to the ordi-
nary visa requirements. Therefore, Moroccans from Nador and 
Tetouan may apply for a one year residence permit ‘visado multiple 
limitado’ which allows them to enter and exit the enclaves on a daily 
basis (Ibid). Obviously these permits facilitate the movements of the 
citizens of Nador and Tetouan across the border (Berg and Ehin 2006, 
p.65). However, the visas are only valid for Ceuta and Melilla and do 
not permit access to the rest of the Spanish territories. In fact, Spain 
maintains checks (on identity and documents) on sea and air connec-
tions departing from both enclaves and having as their destination the 
Spanish territory.  
 This flexibility should be understood in the context of historical 
interaction between the enclaves and their hinterland. In fact, the eco-
nomic viability of the enclaves depends on their interaction with their 
hinterland (Ferrer-Gallardo 2006, p. 10). This economic dependency, 
which partly explains the visa exceptions, leads to a selective perme-
ability of the border. The fact that the enclaves are asking for an exten-
sion of the visa exemptions for all Moroccan citizens (El País 
16/03/2009) is proof that the enclaves need Moroccan traders (and 
tourists) for their economic survival.  
 As a result of this permeability, thousands of Moroccans13 from 
the adjacent provinces enter the enclaves on a daily basis for trading 
purposes (Gold 2000). This atypical trade, or smuggling, is carried out 
mainly by women and usually consists of basic products such as food 
and clothing, which are packed in bundles. On average, the 
porteadores14[see fig.2] get 50 dirham (4.5€) for every bundle they trans-
port15.  Subsequently, these goods are transported and resold in the 
northern provinces of Morocco (El Pais 18/11/2008). This unorthodox 
trade is estimated at 440 million Euro (data from 2006) in Melilla 
(which represents over 40% of the local economy according to the 
Government Delegation), and 500 million Euro in Ceuta (El Pais 
                                         
12 Agreement on the Accession of the Spanish Kingdom of Spain (Declaration on 
the towns of Ceuta and Melilla) 
13 Sources from the Spanish National Police estimates that the figure is between 
20,000 and 30,000 
14 It can be translated as porters.  
15 It usually weights between 50 and 70 kg.  
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15/07/2008). If we take the illegal trade into account, Spain becomes 
the main trade partner for Morocco. The latter also benefits from the 
illegal trade since it supports 45,000 direct jobs and 400,000 indirect 
jobs. 
 
Figure 2-Porteadores queuing in the Ceuta border (Diario Sur 16/11/2007)  
 
 However, since Morocco lies around and behind Ceuta and 
Melilla, this diversity and flexibility has not been appreciated by 
Spanish officials but has rather been feared. The main fear has always 
been the Moroccanisation of both cities which might eventually result in 
the loss of sovereignty. Apart from assuring its national sovereignty, 
Spain has to be very cautious in not outraging Morocco. It cannot 
therefore treat the enclaves in the same way as other parts of the 
country because what is at stake is the relationship with an important 
partner and the stability of the region (Gold 2000). 
 Finally, it should be noted that Ceuta and Melilla are not only or-
dinary borderlands, but they are also (semi)enclaves, that is to say, 
they are territories enclosed within a territory of another state. Hence, 
the fact of being enclaves is important for two basic reasons. Firstly, 
the lives of the enclave dwellers are influenced by the fact that their 
village is an enclave. Secondly, the enclave influences the relations 
between the mainland and the surrounding state to an un-propor-
tional degree compared to the smallness of its territory and population 
(Vinokurov 2007, p.5). Indeed, the existence of the enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla has a powerful negative impact in the bilateral relations 
between Morocco (the surrounding state) and Spain (the mainland) 
(Vinokurov 2007, p.180).  
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The identity challenge 
The importance of symbols in the enclaves 
In Ceuta and Melilla the analysis of symbolism becomes salient. The 
Spanish flag is a paradigmatic example; it can be found everywhere. 
Its presence is, without a doubt, much more prominent in Ceuta and 
Melilla than in the rest of the country. One of the plausible explana-
tions of this omnipresence of the flag is, again, the permanent fear of 
Morocconisation that was mentioned above. In recent years, the EU flag 
has accompanied most of the Spanish flags. The EU flag also serves to 
clearly state that the enclaves are European cities, and as a result, not 
Moroccan.  
 The flag derives its importance from the fact that ‘it converts 
intricate notions about the nation-state into relatively undifferentiated 
sentiments and commitment, as in the case of patriotism’ (Driessen 
1992, p.111). Similarly, Billig (1995, p.41) has conceptualised flags as 
banal reminders of nationhood. Precisely this banality contributes to 
make flags powerful symbols because unlike commemorations, they 
operate unconsciously, they are part of the social environment and, as 
a result, they remain unsaluted, unwaved and even unnoticed (Billig 
1995, p. 40). Billig (1995, p.38) labels this process as forgotten reminding, 
that is to say, ‘the remembering not being experienced as remember-
ing, is, in effect, forgotten’.   
 At the end, the national flag is the repository of the legitimate 
power of the state (Driessen p.112). Therefore, symbols like the flag 
not only express meaning but they provide people with the means to 
make meaning (Cohen 1985, p.19) which entails the assumption that 
symbols are malleable. Its malleability means that these symbols are 
made to fit in different circumstances allowing one community (in this 
case the Spanish Christian community) to distinguish itself from 
others but most importantly to legitimise its power: ‘A State must 
always have specific symbolic and institutional practices for narrating, 
signifying and legitimizing the existence of a nation and the bounded 
space that it occupies’ (Paasi 1999, p.9) 
 Another exceptionality of the enclaves in terms of symbols is the 
prevalence, particularly in Melilla, of symbols glorifying the Spanish 
Dictator Francisco Franco and his fascist regime (1939-1975). In effect, 
Melilla has the dubious honour of being the last city in Spain with a 
statue of the dictator. This could be explained by the fact that Franco 
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defended the city from a Berber revolt in 1921 as a commander from 
the Spanish army, but also because a considerable majority of the en-
clave dwellers16 do not see Franco as a fascist dictator but as a libera-
tor17 from the city and therefore there has been little pressure for the 
removal of the statue. 
 In effect there are, at least, five different monuments in Melilla 
related to the dictatorship; the above-mentioned statue of Franco, a 
monument dedicated to Franco's victory, a cross commemorating 
those who fell for God and Spain (meaning the Franco supporters), a 
plaque commemorating the place where Franco lived and an eques-
trian monument inside the Legión18 military headquarters. In Ceuta, 
there are the Franco footprints in cement. 
 
 
Figure 3-One of the Fascists Statues19 in Melilla (photography by author) 
 
Precisely, during Franco’s regime Spain was (symbolically) defined as 
a ‘unity of destiny through the Universal’20. Therefore we can notice a 
process of objectification behind the symbolism which allows the 
bearer (of the symbolic power) to strategically use mental representa-
tions in order to accomplish its material and symbolic interests 
(Bourdieu 1991, p.221). Kertzter (1988, p.6) provides us with a wider 
                                         
16 It is important not to forget that the Spanish civil war started in Melilla. 
Moreover, each enclave has over 3200 soldiers. 
17 From the Muslim invader 
18 The ‘Legión’ is an elite unit of the Spanish army. 
19 ‘Una grande y libre’ was the most common slogan used by Franco. It literally 
means ‘a great and free (nation)’. The eagle, known as águila de San Juan, was 
another common element in the dictatorship iconography. With the restoration of 
democracy, both the slogan and the eagle were eliminated. Note that the 
photography was taken in April 2009.  
20 Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional  de 1958  
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perspective of symbolism. His point is that as the state is invisible the 
nation needs not only to be imagined, but also symbolised and per-
sonified. 
 From this standpoint, it can be inferred that symbols are means 
by which we give meaning to the world around us (Kertzer 1988, p.4) 
and by which the state is brought into ‘close relation with the whole 
organic world’ (Walzer 1967, p.195). In similar terms, Kertzer (1988, 
p.85) adds that ‘Through ritual [...] we not only make sense of the 
world around us, but we are also led to believe that the order we see is 
not of our own (cultural) making, but rather an order that belong to 
the external world itself’  
 Consequently, it is important to concentrate on the role of sym-
bols and rituals in the enclaves since they strengthen the social divi-
sions because they have a unique emotional impact on people. For in-
stance, I will mention two clear examples of symbols and rituals that 
play a pivotal role in dividing the communities in the enclaves: Sábado 
Legionario in Ceuta and el Levantamiento del Sitio in Melilla. The former 
is a Spanish army tribute to the fallen soldiers, which glorifies death 
and sacrifice for Spain and the Spanishness of the enclaves. The latter 
is a commemoration of the defeat of the Moroccan Sultan on the 19th of 
March 1775 by the Spanish troops, which includes a Catholic cere-
mony. It is important, even though it is not surprising, to highlight 
that no Muslim representative attends this rally21. The Melillean re-
searcher Enrique Delgado (El Faro Melilla 21/3/2009) questions this 
commemoration on the basis that it recalls unnecessarily a war be-
tween Christians and Muslims which might jeopardise the coexistence 
of these two communities at present. 
 As it can be inferred from these examples, symbolic power has a 
noteworthy drawback -it can only be exercised when it is recognised. 
Therefore, for this process to work, those who submit to the power 
have to believe in the legitimacy of the symbols and of those who in-
strumentalise them (Bourdieu 1991, p.170). The notion of ‘recognition’ 
is crucial in understanding that symbols are interpreted by people 
who ‘impute meaning to them in the light of their own experiences 
and purposes’ (Cohen 1985, p.98). Therefore, it can be stated that sym-
                                         
21 Coalición por Melilla (CpM), the main Muslim party, is strongly criticised, every 
year, by some members of the Christian community for not attending the rally.  
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bols cannot work in vacuo, since they need to be recognised and filled 
with meaning. 
 Paradoxically, the de-territorialisation process has led to a situa-
tion where territorial borders between the great civilisations are (ar-
guably) fading away but simultaneously mental borders are being re-
invented (Roy 2004, p.20). Cohen (1985, p.117) agrees with Roy in the 
sense that ‘the diminution of geographical bases of community 
boundaries has led to their renewed assertion in symbolic terms’. 
Hence, we can conclude that these mental communities work as a re-
pository of meaning and as a reference for identity. But most impor-
tantly, through these invented frontiers, strangers are construed and 
transmogrified into an alien, and the alien into a (necessary) threat 
(Bauman 2001, p.115). Put differently, ‘we only come to know our-
selves as a self by representing the other as distinct from ourselves’ 
(Houtum 2003, p.42) 
 In similar terms, Ó Thuatail (1999, p.28) argues that in order to 
reduce the irredeemable global problems of the contemporary risk so-
ciety, risk is represented as the enemy and drawing boundaries is a 
necessary process to protect ourselves against the enemy. Reading the 
reports about Sub-Saharan immigrants trying to reach the enclaves by 
Spanish newspapers serves to prove Ó Thuatails’ point. Indeed, both 
right-wing22 and left-wing23 newspapers use derogatory expressions, 
which entail the notion of risk, such as avalanche or assault when refer-
ring to immigrants trying to surmount the barriers in Ceuta and 
Melilla. 
 
The symbolic border between Spain and Morocco 
The fact that around 40% of the population in Ceuta and 50% in 
Melilla24 is of Muslim faith (and Moroccan origin) involves historical 
prejudices between the Spanish and the Moors, which is connected 
with a past (and also constructed narratives) of invasions and Chris-
tian reconquistas. Vidal (2004, p.493) claims that since its independence 
in 1956, Morocco has been a dangerous and vindictive enemy of the 
Spanish nation and that Islam poses the major problem that Spain is 
                                         
22 El Mundo, 14 December  2005 
23 El Pais, 10 October  2005 
24 This percentage is approximate since it is very difficult to establish an exact 
figure. To these percentages though, we should add the 30.000 Moroccans who 
cross the border for trading purposes on a daily basis. 
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facing today (Vidal 2004, p. 16). Driessen (1998, p.101) agrees that the 
border between the two Mediterranean countries has never been sta-
ble. To this local factor, we shall connect the global factor, that is to 
say, the negative prejudices against Muslim minorities that have been 
widespread in Europe, particularly after the 11th of September 2001.  
 The unprecedented visit of the Spanish monarchs to Ceuta and 
Melilla in November 2007 can be seen as highly symbolic since it was 
the first visit of a Spanish head of state to the enclaves since 1927. On 
the one hand, the visit created great enthusiasm among the enclave 
dwellers and was appreciated by the presidents of both autonomous 
cities, Juan José Imbroda (Melilla) and Juan Jesús Vivas (Ceuta) (La 
Razón 5/11/2007). The latter, for instance, highlighted that the royal 
visit generated optimism and confidence to the Ceutans and recalled 
that the city ‘had always been linked with Spain’. This assertion is 
fairly controversial considering that the city of Ceuta was conquered 
by Portugal in 1415 and did not become Spanish until 1668 (Ferrer-
Gallardo 2006, p.4). On the other hand, the visit by the Spanish royal 
family created a correlate level of anger on the Moroccan side. 
 Subsequently, the Moroccan monarch, Mohammed VI, recalled 
the Moroccan ambassador in Madrid and strongly condemned the 
visit. He warned the Spanish authorities that they would need ‘to face 
up to their responsibilities for jeopardizing the future of the relations 
between the two countries’ as well as for causing a ‘serious breach of 
the letter and the spirit of the 1991 friendship, neighbourliness and co-
operation treaty’ (Maghreb Arab Press 6/11/2007). What seems clear 
through the passionate reaction of both sides is that this symbolic visit 
had real political effects in consolidating the status-quo and the 
Spanishness of both enclaves.  
 The symbolic division between both states is also poignant in re-
gards to migration. Herrero de Miñón (1999) who is one of the fathers 
of the Spanish Constitution25, for instance, argued in favour of filters 
                                         
25 Miguel Herrero y Rodriguez de Miñón is considered to be one of the seven 
fathers of the Spanish Constitution (1978). The constitution was written by seven 
politicians who belonged to different political parties and who represented the 
different sensitivities of the Spanish political spectrum; AP (right-wing), UCD 
(centre-right) PSOE (social-democrats), PSUC (communists) and CIU (Catalan 
nationalists). 
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on ‘linguistic and cultural affinity’26, with the underlying purpose of 
excluding Moroccans, while favouring Latin-Americans, Romanians 
and Slavs (López Garcia 2002, p.66). The point seems to be that these 
migrants do not threaten the notion of Spanishness, as much as 
Moroccanization does. In fact, even Samuel Huntington (1996, p.119-
120) in his controversial Clash of civilisations, explicitly mentions Spain 
as a country ‘uneasy confronted by Maghreb neighbours with popula-
tion growing more than ten times as fast and per capita GNP about 
one-tenth its own’. 
 The uniqueness of the situation in Ceuta and Melilla is that 
Muslim communities are not newcomers, like in the rest of Spain, 
since they started to settle in the enclaves during the 1930s and spe-
cially the 1940s. Therefore, the majority of them have been living in the 
enclaves for decades. Another significant difference is that the 
Moroccan state regards these two cities as the last vestiges of Spanish 
colonialism27, and therefore, as Moroccan towns (still) under Spanish 
occupation.   
 
Conclusion 
First of all it seems evident that that the remarking of the Spanish 
southern border by the EC (now EU) in 1986 changed the economic 
and political relations in the region leading to several border and 
identity challenges. One of the most salient was the creation of a so-
phisticated system of wired fences, in the mid-199028, aimed at stop-
ping immigrants from entering the EU, and arguably to explicitly de-
lineate the boundaries between the EU and Africa.  
 However, the fences were proven completely ineffective in stop-
ping the increasing migratory pressure from Africa. In effect, the 
reinforcement of the security of the fences has not stopped immigra-
tion but has diverted it to the Strait of Gibraltar and other routes. This 
approach based almost exclusively on policing the border and empha-
sising the security aspects of the border policies has led to the idea of 
                                         
26 Ironically, in Europe most Muslims come from areas with historical ties to the 
host country (Roy 2004, p.100); Most North Africans chose France, Southern 
Asians the UK and Moroccans from the former Spanish protectorate,  Spain. 
27 See Moroccan foreign minister Taieb Fassi Fihri declaration (Maghreb Arab 
Press 3/11/2007) and Mohammed VI communiqué 6/11/2007. 
28 in 1993 started the construction in Ceuta and in 1996 in Melilla  
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Fortress Europe, which is in sharp contrast with the Europe of bridges 
that the EU claims to represent. 
 The objective of delimiting the border though, has been more ef-
fective. Thus, the fences play a pivotal role in, physically but most im-
portantly symbolically, dividing what is inside and what is not. Inside 
Ceuta and Melilla, symbolism has also a very significant effect 
through, commemorations, Spanish (and EU) flags, royal visits, etc. It 
seems obvious that all these symbols and rituals contribute to the logic 
of “us versus them” and, consequently, they have the primary goal of 
differentiating what is Spanish from what is foreign, that is to say, 
Moroccan.  
 Because of their geographical location, their enclave character 
and the fact of being a border region, Ceuta and Melilla are in the front 
line of the bordering process. As a result, they are trapped between a 
national division between Spain and Morocco and between a post-
national division between the EU and a non-EU country (Morocco). It 
is worth noting that the introduction of the post-national border did 
not erase the national border. Instead both territorial lines are juxta-
posed and constitute a two-folded territorial amalgam (Ferrer-
Gallardo 2006, p.7). These multiple divisions contribute to challenge 
the already difficult equilibrium between the different communities 
within the enclaves.  
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